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ABSTRACT
We present ClearView, a system for automatically patching errors
in deployed software. ClearView works on stripped Windows x86
binaries without any need for source code, debugging information,
or other external information, and without human intervention.
ClearView(1)observesnormalexecutionstolearninvariantsthat
characterize the application’s normal behavior, (2) uses error detec-
tors to distinguish normal executions from erroneous executions,
(3) identiﬁes violations of learned invariants that occur during er-
roneous executions, (4) generates candidate repair patches that en-
force selected invariants by changing the state or ﬂow of control to
make the invariant true, and (5) observes the continued execution
of patched applications to select the most successful patch.
ClearView is designed to correct errors in software with high
availability requirements. Aspects of ClearView that make it par-
ticularly appropriate for this context include its ability to gener-
ate patches without human intervention, apply and remove patches
to and from running applications without requiring restarts or oth-
erwise perturbing the execution, and identify and discard ineffec-
tive or damaging patches by evaluating the continued behavior of
patched applications.
ClearView was evaluated in a Red Team exercise designed to
test its ability to successfully survive attacks that exploit security
vulnerabilities. A hostile external Red Team developed ten code
injectionexploitsandusedtheseexploitstorepeatedlyattackanap-
plication protected by ClearView. ClearView detected and blocked
all of the attacks. For seven of the ten exploits, ClearView automat-
ically generated patches that corrected the error, enabling the appli-
cationtosurvivetheattacksandcontinueontosuccessfullyprocess
subsequent inputs. Finally, the Red Team attempted to make Clear-
View apply an undesirable patch, but ClearView’s patch evaluation
mechanism enabled ClearView to identify and discard both ineffec-
tive patches and damaging patches.
1. Introduction
We present ClearView, a system for automatically correcting er-
rors in deployed software systems with high availability require-
ments. Previous research has shown how to detect errors, for exam-
ple by monitoring the execution for buffer overruns, illegal control
transfers, or other potentially incorrect behavior [19, 31, 21]. The
standard mitigation strategy is to terminate the application, essen-
tially converting all errors into denial of service. In many important
scenarios, system availability is a strict requirement. In such sce-
narios, it is imperative to eliminate the denial of service and enable
the application to continue to provide service even in the face of
errors.
ClearView can automatically correct previously unknown errors
in commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) software systems. It patches
running applications without requiring restarts or otherwise per-
turbing the execution. It requires no human interaction or inter-
vention. And it works on stripped Windows x86 binaries without
access to source code or debugging information.
Figure 1 presents the architecture of ClearView, which has ﬁve
components:
• Learning: ClearViewdynamicallyobservestheapplication’s
behavior during normal executions to infer a model that char-
acterizes those normal executions. The model is a collection
of properties, also called invariants, over the observed values
of registers and memory locations. As the name suggests, in-
variants are always satisﬁed during the observed normal ex-
ecutions. As ClearView observes more executions, its model
becomes more accurate. Our current ClearView implementa-
tion uses an enhanced version of Daikon [14] as its learning
component.
• Monitoring: ClearView monitors detect failures to classify
each execution as normal or erroneous. For each erroneous
execution, the monitor also indicates the location in the bi-
nary where it detected the failure. ClearView is designed
to incorporate arbitrary monitors. Our current implemen-
tation uses two monitors: Heap Guard (which detects out
of bounds memory writes) and Determina Memory Firewall
(a commercial implementation of program shepherding [21]
which detects illegal control ﬂow transfers). Each monitor
prevents negative consequences by terminating the applica-
tion when it detects a failure. Our current monitors have no
false positives in that they never classify a normal execution
as erroneous. But they are also only designed to detect a spe-
ciﬁc class of errors (heap buffer overﬂows and illegal control
ﬂow transfers). ClearView is not designed to eliminate all
failures, only those that a monitor detects.
• Correlated Invariant Identiﬁcation: When a monitor de-
tects a failure, ClearView applies a set of patches that check
previously learned invariants close to the location of the fail-
ure. Note that these invariant checking patches are not in-
tended to correct errors or eliminate the failure. The goal
is instead to ﬁnd a set of correlated invariants that charac-
terize normal and erroneous executions. Speciﬁcally, each
correlated invariant is always satisﬁed during normal execu-
tions but violated during erroneous executions (which typi-
cally occur in response to repeated or replayed attacks).
• Candidate Repair Generation: For each correlated invari-
ant, ClearView generates a set of candidate repair patches
that enforce the invariant. Some of these patches change the
values of registers and memory locations to reestablish the
invariant whenever it is violated. Others change the ﬂow of
control to enforce observed control ﬂow invariants.Monitoring
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Figure 1: The ClearView Architecture
The hypothesis is that some errors violate invariants, that en-
forcing violated invariants can correct the effects of these er-
rors, and that correcting these effects can, in turn, change the
execution of the application to eliminate the corresponding
failure. The goal is to ﬁnd a patch that corrects the execu-
tion after the ﬁrst error has occurred but before any effects
have propagated far enough to make a failure inevitable. To
accomplish this goal, ClearView must ﬁnd and correct errors
that occur early enough in the execution to make the execu-
tion salvageable via the invariant enforcement mechanism.
• Candidate Repair Evaluation: A candidate repair patch
may have no effect or even a negative effect on the patched
application. ClearView therefore evaluates patches by con-
tinuously observing patched applications as they execute. It
ranks each patch based on whether it observes any failures
or crashes when the patch is in place. At each point in time
ClearView attempts to minimize the likelihood of negative
effects by applying the most highly ranked patch. The fact
that patches affect the execution only when a correlated in-
variant is violated also tends to minimize the possibility that
they will negatively affect normal executions.
We acknowledge that, in some cases, the application’s main-
tainers (if they exist) may wish to ﬁnd and eliminate the de-
fect in the source code (if it still exists) responsible for the
failure. ClearView supports this activity by providing infor-
mation about the failure, speciﬁcally the location where it de-
tected the failure, the correlated invariants, the strategy that
each candidate repair patch used to enforce the invariant, and
information about the effectiveness of each patch. This in-
formation may help the maintainers more quickly understand
and eliminate the corresponding defect. In the meantime, the
automatically generated ClearView patches can enable the
application to survive to provide acceptable service.
ClearView is designed around the concept of learning from fail-
ure (and from success, too). This process of learning enables the
quality of ClearView’s patches to improve over time, similarly to a
biological immune system. The ﬁrst time it detects a failure, Clear-
View learns a failure location in the application. This information
enables ClearView to target subsequent instrumentation and inter-
vention only where it is likely to be effective. The next several
times it encounters the failure, ClearView learns the variables and
data structures that are corrupted and the invariants that are vio-
lated. This information enables ClearView to generate candidate
repair patches that may correct the error and eliminate the failure.
Then, ClearView applies the patches. As the application processes
subsequent inputs, ClearView obtains information that it can use to
evaluate the effectiveness of each patch. This evaluation enables
ClearView to discard ineffective or damaging patches while apply-
ing successful patches that are able to eliminate the failure without
negatively affecting the application.
1.1 Red Team Evaluation
As part of DARPA’s Application Communities program (www.
darpa.mil/IPTO/programs/ac/ac.asp), DARPA hired Sparta,
Inc. (www.sparta.com) to perform an independent and adversarial
Red Team evaluation of ClearView. The goal was to evaluate Clear-
View’s effectiveness in eliminating security vulnerabilities. Given
the need for fast automated response to attacks that target such vul-
nerabilities, the time lag typically associated with human interven-
tion (it takes 28 days on average for maintainers to develop and dis-
tributeﬁxesforsucherrors[41]), andClearView’sabilitytoquickly
and automatically generate and evaluate patches without human in-
tervention, we anticipate that ClearView may be especially useful
in this context.
In the Red Team exercise, ClearView protected an application
community, which is a set of computers that all run the same soft-
ware — in this case, the Firefox web browser. The community
cooperates to learn information about attacks, then uses that infor-
mation to provide immunity to all members (including members
with no previous exposure to the attack) after only several have
been attacked. The community also reduces the time required to
obtain an effective patch.
During the Red Team exercise, the Red Team developed ten bi-
nary code injection exploits and used these exploits to repeatedly
attack the community. The results show that:
• Attacks Blocked: ClearView detected and blocked all of the
attacks.
• Successful Continued Execution: For seven of the ten ex-
ploits, ClearViewautomaticallygeneratedandappliedapatch
that corrected the underlying error and enabled the applica-
tion to execute successfully even in the face of the attack.
For two of the remaining three exploits, changes to the Clear-
View Red Team exercise conﬁguration enabled ClearView to
automatically generate similarly successful patches.
• Patch Quality: Some of the candidate repair patches that
ClearView evaluated either did not eliminate the failure or
introduced new negative effects such as causing the patched
application to crash. ClearView’s patch evaluation mecha-
nism recognized and discarded such patches, enabling Clear-
View to ﬁnd and distribute patches that eliminated the failure
without negative effects. The Red Team was unable to ﬁnd
a legitimate input that the ﬁnal patched version of Firefox
processed incorrectly.
• No False Positives: The Red Team was unable to elicit any
ClearView false positives. Speciﬁcally, the Red Team was
unable to cause ClearView to apply patches in the absence of
an attack.
By making it possible to automatically survive otherwise fatal
errors and attacks, our techniques may increase the robustness and
availability of our computing infrastructure in a world increasingly
full of errors and security vulnerabilities.
21.2 Contributions
This paper makes the following contributions:
• Learning: It shows how to observe normal executions to au-
tomaticallylearninvariantsinstrippedWindowsx86binaries
with no access to source code or debugging information.
• Invariants and Patches: It identiﬁes a set of invariants and
corresponding patches that can automatically detect and cor-
rect errors and security vulnerabilities.
• Invariant Selection and Patch Evaluation: It shows how
to automatically respond to a failure by selecting a promis-
ing set of correlated invariants to enforce, then evaluating the
corresponding candidate repair patches to ﬁnd a patch that
enables the application to survive errors and attacks without
service interruptions. Because the patch evaluation mecha-
nism continually evaluates the effectiveness of the patches,
it can recognize and discard ineffective or damaging patches
even long after they were originally applied.
• Application Communities: It shows how to enable com-
munities of machines to work together as a group to survive
errors and attacks and continue to successfully execute. The
members of the community share invariant learning infor-
mation and beneﬁt from the experience of other members to
obtain full immunity without prior exposure.
• RedTeamEvaluation: Itpresentsexperimentalresultsfrom
a hostile Red Team evaluation of ClearView. These results
show that, for seven of the ten security exploits that the Red
Team developed, ClearView produced patches that enabled
the application to survive the attacks and continue on to suc-
cessfully process subsequent inputs. There were no false
positives — the Red Team was unable to make ClearView
apply a patch in the absence of an error or attack.
• Natural Resilience: It provides further evidence that, when
augmented with simple survival techniques that enable con-
tinued execution through errors without termination, large
software systems are naturally resilient to errors and attacks.
This empirically observed resilience suggests that the most
productive way to achieve robust software systems is to au-
tomatically apply survival techniques that modify the appli-
cation and/or the execution environment to enable continued
execution in the face of errors. This approach stands in stark
contrast to standard attempts to develop error-free systems
on top of existing brittle programming languages and exe-
cution environments. It also provides additional intriguing
evidence that the complexity inherently present in large soft-
ware systems may protect such systems from any negative
effects of the localized perturbations characteristic of errors
after the automatic application of survival techniques.
2. ClearView Implementation
This section describes ClearView’s implementation of each com-
ponent of the architecture of Figure 1: learning (Section 2.2), moni-
toring(Section2.3), correlatedinvariantidentiﬁcation(Section2.4),
repair generation (Section 2.5), and repair evaluation (Section 2.6).
All of these components build on the capabilities of various com-
ponents of the Determina commercial product suite (Section 2.1).
We adopt the following conceptual framework from the software
reliability community. A defect is a mistake in the source code of
the application. An error occurs when the application does some-
thing incorrect, such as compute an incorrect value, while it is run-
ning. In general, a failure is an observable error, i.e., a violation
of the application’s speciﬁcation that is visible to a user. In this
paper we narrow the deﬁnition of failure to include only errors that
are detected by a ClearView monitor. Other errors that cause the
application to terminate are crashes. The remaining kinds of er-
rors are anomalies, i.e., violations of the application’s speciﬁcation
that do not cause the application to terminate and are not detected
by a ClearView monitor. An exploit is an input to an application
that causes the application to violate its speciﬁcation. An attack
is a presentation of an exploit to an application. Note that defects
and errors are undesirable primarily to the extent that they cause
failures, crashes, or anomalies.
2.1 Determina Components
The Determina Managed Program Execution Environment uses
DynamoRIO [4] to enable the efﬁcient, transparent, and compre-
hensive manipulation of an unmodiﬁed application at the binary
code level with reasonable time and memory overhead. All code
executes out of a code cache, with an exported interface that allows
plugins to validate and (if desired) transform new code blocks be-
fore they enter the cache for execution. Plugins can also eject pre-
viously inserted code blocks from the cache. Plugins can use this
functionality to apply and remove patches to and from running ap-
plications without otherwise perturbing the execution. ClearView
uses this capability to apply and remove patches that enable Clear-
View to check and enforce invariants.
DeterminaMemoryFirewall detectsallillegalcontrolﬂowtrans-
fers and intervenes to terminate the execution before any injected
code can execute (note that the detection and intervention typically
take place only after the attack has corrupted the application state
to the point where the application can no longer execute success-
fully). Speciﬁcally, when an instruction in the code cache attempts
to jump to code outside of the cache, Memory Firewall performs
a validation check on the control ﬂow transfer [21]. If the trans-
fer passes the validation check, the Managed Program Execution
Environment links the target code block into the code cache (af-
ter applying any desired instrumentation or patches), then jumps
to this target code block to continue the execution from the code
cache. This implementation of program shepherding protects client
applications from binary code injection attacks [21].
The Determina Management Console can monitor and control a
large set of distributed client machines. It runs on a central server
that stores patches and communicates securely with instantiations
oftheDeterminaNodeManagerrunningoneachclient. EachNode
Manager interacts with its corresponding Managed Program Ex-
ecution Environment instance to appropriately apply and remove
patches to and from running and newly launched applications. Sev-
eral ClearView Management Console plugins build on the Manage-
ment Console functionality to coordinate ClearView’s interaction
with client machines so that they appropriately apply and remove
ClearView patches.
2.2 Learning
The learning component observes normal executions to infer a
model of the normal behavior of the application. This model con-
sists of a set of invariants that were satisﬁed in all observed execu-
tions. Each invariant is a logical formula that was always satisﬁed
at a speciﬁc instruction in the application. Because ClearView op-
erates on binaries, the variables in the formulas represent values
(speciﬁcally, the values of registers and memory locations) that are
meaningful at the level of the compiled binary.
2.2.1 Daikon
ClearViewusesDaikon[15]asitslearningcomponent. ADaikon
implementation has two components: a front end that extracts trace
data from a running application, and a core inference engine that
processes the trace data to infer the invariants. Daikon was orig-
3inally developed to learn source-level invariants. As part of the
ClearView development effort we used the Determina Managed
Program Execution Environment to implement a new Daikon front
end (the x86 front end) that instruments the instructions in basic
blocks, as they enter the code cache, to emit the appropriate trace
data when they execute.
For each instruction, the trace data includes the values of all
operands that the instruction reads and all addresses that the in-
struction computes. Consider, for example, mov [ebp+12], eax,
which moves the value in memory location ebp+12 into the regis-
ter eax. This instruction computes one address (ebp+12) and reads
one operand (the value in this address). Every time the instruc-
tion executes, the ClearView instrumentation produces a trace entry
containing this data.
2.2.2 Invariant Variables and Locations
Several considerations determine the set of variables over which
the core Daikon inference engine operates when it infers the invari-
ants for a given instruction. First, the set of variables must be large
enough to enable the inference of meaningful invariants whose en-
forcement can correct our target class of errors. Second, the set
must be small enough to make the inference task computationally
tractable. Finally, the values in the variables must be deﬁned in all
possible executions (and not just the observed executions).
At each instruction (call this instruction the target instruction),
the core Daikon inference engine operates over all variables that are
computed in the procedure containing the target instruction (see
Section 2.2.3) by either the target instruction itself or another in-
struction that predominates the target instruction.1 Each invariant
must also include a variable that the target instruction computes.
2.2.3 Procedure Control Flow Graphs
Tocomputepredominators, ClearViewbuildsacontrolﬂowgraph
for each executed procedure. The nodes in the graph are basic
blocks (as determined by the Determina Managed Program Execu-
tion Engine as it executes the application) instead of instructions.
The edges represent the ﬂow of control between basic blocks.
The control ﬂow graph construction algorithm uses a novel com-
bined static and dynamic analysis. This analysis eliminates the
need to ﬁnd procedure entry points statically (a complex task in
a stripped x86 executable). It maintains a database of known con-
trol ﬂow graphs (with one control ﬂow graph for each dynamically
encountered procedure). It ﬁnds new procedures by considering
each basic block the ﬁrst time it executes. If the basic block is not
already in a known control ﬂow graph, the algorithm assumes that
the basic block is the entry point for a new procedure. It then uses
symbolic execution to dynamically trace out the basic blocks in and
construct the control ﬂow graph for this new procedure. It uses the
ﬁrst basic block as the entry basic block of the new procedure.
During the symbolic execution, the algorithm ends the proce-
dure at return instructions and indirect jump instructions for which
it cannot compute the jump target. Note that this algorithm may
break a single static procedure up into multiple dynamically dis-
covered procedures. In practice such procedure ﬁssion happens
relatively rarely. The only potential drawback is that splitting pro-
cedures in this way may reduce the set of values available to the in-
variant inference engine at a given instruction, which may, in turn,
reduce the set of invariants that the inference engine can infer for
that instruction.
1An instruction i predominates an instruction j if all control ﬂow
paths to j must ﬁrst go through i. If i predominates j, then when-
ever the ﬂow of control reaches j, i has previously executed and
all of the values computed in i are valid.
2.2.4 Additional Properties and Optimizations
ClearView analyzes the control ﬂow graphs to identify sets of
distinctvariables(thesevariablesdenotevaluesinregistersormem-
ory locations) in the same procedure that always have the same
value. Itthenpostprocessesthetracedatatoremovealloccurrences
of such variables except the one from the earliest instruction to ex-
ecute. This optimization reduced the number of inferred invariants
by a factor of two, which in turn reduced the learning, invariant
checking, and repair evaluation time.
AnotherClearViewpostprocessingstepanalyzesthetracedatato
discover invariants involving stack pointer offsets. As a procedure
allocates and deallocates local variables and calls other procedures,
it may change the value of the stack pointer. Stack pointer offset
invariants of the form sp1 = sp2+c capture the resulting relation-
ships between the stack pointer sp1 at the entry point of the proce-
dure and stack pointers sp2 at various points within the procedure.
ClearView uses this information to adjust the stack pointer appro-
priately for repairs that skip procedure calls or return immediately
from the enclosing procedure (see Section 2.5.1).
We also extended the set of Daikon invariants to include infor-
mation about which variables contain pointer values. Speciﬁcally,
if a negative value or value between 1 and 100,000 ever appears in
a variable, Daikon infers that it is not a pointer. Otherwise, Daikon
infers that it is a pointer. Daikon uses this information to skip the
inference of lower-bound or less-than invariants that involve point-
ers. This optimization reduces the learning, invariant checking, and
repair evaluation time.
2.3 Monitoring
ClearView can incorporate any monitor that can detect a failure
and provide a failure location (the program counter of the instruc-
tionwherethemonitordetectedthefailure). Thecurrentimplemen-
tation uses Memory Firewall to detect illegal control ﬂow transfer
errors. This monitor is always enabled in a running application.
Heap Guard: The Heap Guard monitor detects out of bounds
memory accesses. It places canary values at the boundaries of al-
located memory blocks and instruments all writes into the heap to
check if the written location contains the canary value. The pres-
ence of the canary value indicates either an out of bounds write
or a legitimate previous write (by the application) of the canary
value within the bounds of an allocated memory block. When Heap
Guard encounters a canary value, it therefore searches an alloca-
tion map to determine if the written address is within the bounds
of some allocated memory block. If so, normal execution contin-
ues; if not, Heap Guard has detected an out of bounds write error.
By design, Heap Guard suffers no false positives. It may, however,
miss an out of bounds write error if the out of bounds write skips
over the boundaries of the allocated memory block.
Heap Guard is useful in two different ways. First, it can detect
out of bounds writes that do not eventually cause illegal control
ﬂow transfers. In this way, Heap Guard may enable ClearView to
detect (and therefore potentially correct) out of bounds write errors
that Memory Firewall does not detect.
Second, even when an out of bounds write error would eventu-
ally cause an illegal control ﬂow transfer, Heap Guard may detect
an earlier error than Memory Firewall would. This earlier detection
may enhance ClearView’s ability to ﬁnd a successful patch.
It is possible to dynamically enable and disable Heap Guard as
the application executes without otherwise perturbing the execu-
tion. ClearView could, for example, use this functionality to run
the application without Heap Guard during normal production ex-
ecution, then turn Heap Guard on when an event (such as a failure)
indicates an elevated risk of an out of bounds write error.
4Shadow Stack: ClearView can optionally maintain an auxiliary
shadow procedure call stack. This Shadow Stack enables Clear-
View to traverse the call stack to ﬁnd additional candidate corre-
lated invariants in callers of the procedure containing the failure
location. Enforcing one of these additional invariants may be criti-
cal in enabling ClearView to correct the error.
There are two reasons that ClearView uses the Shadow Stack
rather than attempting to unwind the native call stack. First, a va-
riety of optimizations (such as frame pointer removal and heavily
optimized caller/callee interactions) can make it difﬁcult to reli-
ably traverse a native call stack. Second, errors (such as buffer
overﬂows) may corrupt the native stack, making it unavailable to
ClearView when a monitor detects a failure.
The Shadow Stack contains the addresses of the procedures on
the actual stack, with call and return instructions instrumented to
maintain the Shadow Stack. The instrumentation is largely per-
formed in-line for efﬁciency and can be enabled and disabled as
the application runs without perturbing the execution.
2.4 Correlated Invariant Identiﬁcation
Given a failure location, ClearView attempts to identify invari-
ants whose violation is correlated with the failure. These correlated
invariants have two important properties. First, they are always
satisﬁed in normal executions but violated in erroneous executions.
Second, they are violated before the failure occurs. The rationale is
that using a correlated invariant to force the application back into
its normal operating envelope may correct the error, eliminate the
failure, and enable the application to continue to operate success-
fully.
2.4.1 Candidate Correlated Invariants
ClearView uses the procedure call stack to obtain a set of candi-
date correlated invariants. Speciﬁcally, assume that a procedure P
at instruction i is on the call stack when a monitor detects a failure.
Then any invariant at a predominator of i in P is in the candidate
correlated invariant set.
Note, however, that ClearView implements an optimization that
restricts the set of candidate correlated invariants. Speciﬁcally, if an
invariant relates the values of two variables, the invariant’s instruc-
tion must occur in i’s basic block for ClearView to include the in-
variant in the set of candidate correlated invariants. This additional
restriction substantially reduces both the invariant checking over-
head (see Section 2.4.2) and the number of candidate repairs that
ClearView generates and evaluates when a monitor detects a failure
(see Section 2.5). In practice this optimization did not remove any
useful repairs and (by reducing the number of repairs to evaluate)
decreased the amount of time required to ﬁnd a successful repair.
More generally, ClearView can use virtually any strategy that
identiﬁes a set of candidate correlated invariants that is likely to
produce a successful repair. The three key considerations are 1)
working with the available failure information (in the current im-
plementation this information includes the location of the failure
and, if enabled, the Shadow Stack), 2) making the set large enough
to include an invariant that produces a successful repair, and 3)
limiting the size of the set to make it feasible to efﬁciently check
the invariants (as described below in Section 2.4.2) and evaluate
the resulting set of candidate repairs (as described below in Sec-
tion 2.6). In particular, if the Shadow Stack is not available, Clear-
View can simply work with invariants associated with instructions
close to the failure location. It is also possible to develop strate-
gies that learn clusters of basic blocks that tend to execute together,
then work with sets of invariants from clusters containing the basic
block where the failure occurred.
2.4.2 Checking Candidate Correlated Invariants
Given a set of candidate correlated invariants, ClearView gener-
ates and deploys a set of patches that check each candidate corre-
lated invariant to determine if it is satisﬁed or violated. Patches
that check the value of a single variable execute when the pro-
gram counter reaches the instruction associated with the variable.
Patches that check the relationship between the values of two vari-
ablesexecutewhentheprogramcounterreachesthesecondinstruc-
tion (to execute) of the two instructions associated with the two
variables. An auxiliary patch associated with the ﬁrst instruction
stores the value of the ﬁrst variable for later retrieval when the in-
variant is checked at the second instruction.
Each invariant checking patch produces an observation every
time it executes. Each observation identiﬁes the invariant and the
location of the failure that triggered the deployment of the patch.
It also indicates whether the invariant was satisﬁed or violated. In
this way the patched application produces, for each combination of
invariant and failure location, a sequence of observations.
2.4.3 Identifying Correlated Invariants
When a monitor detects a failure, ClearView uses the sequences
of invariant checking observations to classify candidate correlated
invariants as follows:
• Highly Correlated: An invariant is highly correlated with
the failure if, each time a monitor detected the failure, it was
violated the last time it was checked and satisﬁed all other
times it was checked.
• Moderately Correlated: An invariant is moderately corre-
lated with the failure if, each time the monitor detected the
failure, it was violated the last time it was checked and, at
least one of the times the monitor detected the failure, it was
also violated at least one other time it was checked.
• Slightly Correlated: An invariant is slightly correlated with
the failure if, at least one of the times the monitor detected
the failure, the invariant was violated at least one of the times
it was checked.
• Not Correlated: An invariant is not correlated with the fail-
ure if it was always satisﬁed.
Note that correlated invariants need not be violated every time
they are checked — one scenario, for example, is that only the
last part of an erroneous execution may exhibit erroneous behav-
ior, with the initial parts exhibiting normal behavior during which
correlated invariants may well be satisﬁed. The candidate repair
generation phase described below in Section 2.5 uses the classiﬁ-
cation to select invariants to enforce.
2.5 Candidate Repair Generation
Given a set of correlated invariants, ClearView generates a set
of candidate repairs to evaluate. Each candidate repair corresponds
to a correlated invariant. The patch that implements the repair ﬁrst
checks to see if the invariant is violated. If so, the patch enforces
the invariant by changing the ﬂow of control, the values of regis-
ters, and/or the values of memory locations to make the invariant
true. Patches for invariants involving only a single variable check
and enforce the invariant at the variable’s instruction. Patches for
invariants involving multiple variables check and enforce the in-
variant at the latest (to execute) of the corresponding instructions
for the involved variables. In general, there may be multiple ways
to enforce a single invariant. ClearView generates a candidate re-
pair for each such invariant enforcement option.
If there are highly correlated invariants, the current ClearView
implementation generates candidate repairs for only those invari-
5ants. If there are no highly correlated invariants, ClearView gener-
ates candidate repairs only for moderately correlated invariants (if
any exist). It would also be possible to generalize this approach
to have ClearView generate candidate repairs for all correlated in-
variants, with the ClearView candidate repair evaluation (see Sec-
tion2.6)usingthecorrelatedinvariantclassiﬁcationtoprioritizethe
evaluation of the corresponding repairs. We next describe the three
ClearView invariants and corresponding repairs that were used dur-
ing the Red Team exercise (see Section 4).
2.5.1 One-of invariant
A one-of invariant has the form v ∈ {c1,c2,...,cn}, where the
ci are constants and v is a variable or expression. This property
identiﬁes all of the values that the variable v ever took on at run
time. There are n repairs of the following form, one for each ob-
served value:
if ! (v == c1 || v == c2 || ... || v == cn) then v = ci
If the application uses v as a function pointer (i.e., v is the tar-
get of a call instruction), another repair simply skips the call. The
repair replaces call *v with
if (v == c1 || v == c2 || ... || v == cn) then call *v
Note that the repair skips the call if the invariant is violated.
A third repair returns immediately from the enclosing procedure
(the actual patch also adjusts the stack pointer to remove the argu-
ments to the call and performs other cleanup):
if ! (v == c1 || v == c2 || ... || v == cn) then return
Thisrepaircanbeusedforanyinvariant, butClearViewcurrently
uses it only for one-of invariants.
Rationale: One-of invariants often characterize the observed tar-
gets of function calls that use function pointers. The use of unini-
tializedmemoryorincorrecttypecastscanproduceerroneousfunc-
tion pointers. Many security attacks also exploit vulnerabilities that
enable attackers to create malicious function pointers. Enforcing
theinvarianteliminatesanyillegalcontrolﬂowtransfer, whichmay,
in turn, enable the application to survive the error or attack.
2.5.2 Lower-bound Invariant
Alower-boundinvarianthastheformc≤v, wherecisaconstant
and v is a variable or expression. One repair has the form:
if ! (c <= v) then v = c
Rationale: One class of defects can cause an array or buffer index
to be negative, which can cause the application to read and/or write
addresses below the start of the array or buffer. A related class of
defects can cause the application to pass a negative number as a
length to a procedure such as memcpy, which treats the number as
a large unsigned integer. The resulting memory copy then writes
beyond the end of the buffer.
Such defects typically result in errors that violate a lower-bound
invariant such as 0 ≤ v. Enforcing the invariant redirects the out-
of-bound index back into the buffer or array, which can prevent
memory corruption and enable the application to survive the error.
2.5.3 Less-than Invariant
A less-than invariant v1 ≤ v2 relates two variables or expres-
sions (by contrast, a lower-bound invariant relates a variable and a
constant). Less-than invariants can be repaired by adjusting either
v2 (as in the lower-bound repair) or v1. One repair is of the form:
if ! (v1 <= v2) then v1 = v2
Rationale: A defect can cause an array or buffer index to exceed
the upper bound of the array or buffer, which can cause the applica-
tion to access addresses above the end of the array or buffer. Such
defects typically cause the application to violate a less-than invari-
ant that captures the requirement that the index must be below the
upper bound of the array or buffer. Enforcing the invariant redi-
rects the out-of-bound index back into the array or buffer, which
can eliminate memory corruption and enable the application to sur-
vive the error.
2.6 Candidate Repair Evaluation
ClearView evaluates each candidate repair to determine which,
if any, is the most effective at correcting the error and enabling the
application to operate normally. ClearView considers the repair to
have failed if the failure still occurs, a new failure occurs, or the
application crashes after repair. ClearView (tentatively) considers
the repair to have succeeded if the application has executed with the
repair in place for at least ten seconds without failing or crashing.
The repair evaluation is based on relative repair scores. When a
repair succeeds, its score increases. When a repair fails, its score
decreases. Since the goal is to ﬁnd a repair that always works,
the scoring system is designed to reward repairs that are always
successful. If a repair ever fails, the system continues to search
for a more successful repair. ClearView therefore uses the scoring
formula (s− f)+b, where s is the number of successes, f is the
number of failures, and b is a positive bonus given to any repair that
has not yet failed. ClearView uses the following criteria to break
ties among repairs with the same score (for instance, all repairs that
have never been tried have score b):
• Earlier Repairs First: ClearView prefers repairs that take
effect earlier in the execution. In a given basic block or pro-
cedure, ClearView prefers repairs from earlier instructions.
Among repairs in different procedures, ClearView prefers re-
pairs in procedures lower on the call stack. The rationale is to
minimize error propagation by correcting the earliest error.
• Minimize Control Flow Changes: Repairs that change the
control ﬂow (such as returning immediately or skipping a
call) are prioritized after repairs that only affect the state.
A repair may eliminate one failure, only to expose another fail-
ure. In this case, ClearView performs the full process of ﬁnd-
ing correlated invariants, generating candidate repair patches, and
evaluating the generated patches all over again, starting with the
patched application. ClearView may therefore generate multiple
patches to repair multiple invariants. This actually happened in the
Red Team exercise (see Section 4.4).
If it cannot ﬁnd a successful repair in the current procedure,
ClearView repeats the repair evaluation process for each procedure
on the call stack.
3. Application Communities
It is possible to apply our technique successfully whenever re-
peated exposures to an error or attack give ClearView the opportu-
nity to learn how to defend against the error or attack. One appro-
priate deployment environment is an application community — a
group of machines running the same application that work together
to detect and eliminate failures and/or to defend themselves against
attacks.
Such a monoculture is convenient for users because it provides
them with a familiar software environment across all machines,
thereby making their data and expertise portable across the entire
computing infrastructure. It can also decrease the system admin-
istration overhead. However, it may also be convenient for attack-
ers, who may be able to exploit a single vulnerability throughout
the entire community. By conﬁguring ClearView to protect an ap-
plication community, we view the software monoculture not as a
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countermeasures that ClearView can deploy to neutralize attacks.
An application community provides the following beneﬁts:
• LearningAccuracy: Thelearningcomponentcanworkwith
many different users, datasets, and usage styles, thereby in-
creasingtheaccuracyofthelearnedinvariantsandthequality
of the applied repair patches.
• Amortized Learning Overhead: ClearView can distribute
the learning overhead across the community, with each mem-
ber incurring overhead for only a small part of the applica-
tion.
• Faster Repair Evaluation: The community can evaluate
candidate repairs in parallel, reducing the time required to
ﬁnd a successful repair.
• Protection Without Exposure: After some members of the
community are attacked and ClearView has found a success-
ful patch, the patch is distributed throughout the community.
The remaining members of the community become immune
to the attack even though they have never been exposed to the
attack. Furthermore, because because the patch corrects the
error, it can enable applications to immediately survive other
attacks that attempt to exploit the same vulnerability, again
with no previous exposure to these attacks (see Section 4).
Our implemented ClearView application community architec-
ture contains components on both the community machines and
a centralized server that coordinates the actions of the community.
An instance of the Determina Node Manager runs on each com-
munity machine. It coordinates the application of patches to appli-
cations running on that machine and provides secure communica-
tion (via SSL) with the Determina Management Console running
on the centralized server. The Management Console coordinates
the distribution of patches to the Node Managers and mediates the
communication between the ClearView components located on the
community machines and the centralized server.
3.1 Amortized Parallel Learning
We extended Daikon to work in parallel across the members of
a community as follows. On each community machine, a local
version of Daikon processes the trace data to compute invariants
that are true on that machine. ClearView periodically uploads the
locally inferred invariants to the centralized server, which uses the
invariants to update ClearView’s centralized database of invariants
thataretrueacrossallexecutionsonallmembersofthecommunity.
Note that ClearView uploads only the learned invariants (and not
the large trace data that the local Daikon uses to infer the invariants)
to the central server.
ClearView is designed to distribute the learning overhead among
the members of the community as follows. Each community ma-
chineselectssomeoftheproceduresintheapplicationtotrace, then
instruments only those procedures to generate trace data. The rest
of the application executes without learning (and without any learn-
ing overhead). The fact that it is possible to learn over arbitrary
parts of the application enables a wide range of distributed learn-
ing strategies, with each strategy designed to optimize the trade-
off between the learning overhead at each community member, the
comprehensiveness of the learning coverage, and the time required
to obtain an acceptable set of invariants. One particularly effective
learning strategy instruments a randomly chosen small part of ev-
ery running application, with new invariants continuously trickling
in from all members of the community. This strategy minimizes
the learning overhead while keeping the invariants up to date with
information from the latest usage patterns.
It is also possible to stage the learning. The ﬁrst learning phase
would record the inputs and the regions (typically procedures) they
exercise in the application. The second learning phase would re-
spond to a failure by instrumenting regions close to the failure loca-
tion, then replaying inputs that exercise these instrumented regions.
Daikon would then process the generated trace data to produce a set
ofcandidatecorrelatedinvariants. Thedrawbackofthisapproachis
that learning only in response to failures would extend the amount
of time required to obtain a successful patch. The advantage is that
it would reduce the learning overhead and eliminate the need for a
large invariant database.
It is important to discard any invariants from executions with er-
rors. Our currently implemented system simply excludes invariants
from erroneous executions. It is also possible to apply more sophis-
ticated strategies, for example delaying the incorporation of newly
learned invariants for a period of time long enough to make any
undesirable effects of the execution apparent. Only after the period
has expired with no observed undesirable effects would the system
use the invariants to update the centralized invariant database.
3.2 Application Community Management
We next describe the actions ClearView takes as it manages the
community in response to a failure.
Detection and Failure Notiﬁcation: A ClearView monitor run-
ningon oneof thecommunity machinesencounters thefailure. The
monitor terminates the application, then uses the underlying Deter-
mina secure communication facilities to notify the central Clear-
View manager of the failure. The notiﬁcation includes the failure
location and (if available) the call stack at the time of the failure.
Identifying Correlated Invariants: The central ClearView man-
ager responds to the failure notiﬁcation by using the failure loca-
tion and call stack to access its central invariant database and com-
pute a set of candidate correlated invariants. For each such invari-
ant, it generates a snippet of C code that checks the invariant, then
compiles the C code to obtain a patch that checks the invariant. It
presents the patches to the Determina infrastructure, which pushes
the patches out to all of the members of the community. The lo-
cal Determina Node Managers apply the patches to executing and
newly launched instances of the application.
As the patches execute, they generate a stream of invariant check
observations that are sent back to the centralized ClearView man-
ager. As described in Section 2.4.3, each observation identiﬁes the
invariant, the failure that caused ClearView to generate the invari-
ant checking patch, and an indication of whether the invariant was
satisﬁed or violated.
Eventually one or more instances of the application may en-
counter the failure again. When the central ClearView manager
receives the failure notiﬁcations, it analyzes the invariant check ob-
servations (as described in Section 2.4.3) to compute a set of corre-
lated invariants. It then uses the Determina infrastructure to remove
the invariant checking patches — the Determina Console Manager
instructs the Determina Node Managers to remove the patches from
any instances of the application on their machines. ClearView cur-
rently performs this step when it receives the second failure noti-
ﬁcation from a version of the application with invariant checking
patches in place. It is straightforward to implement other policies.
The current ClearView conﬁguration always runs applications
with the Shadow Stack and Heap Guard monitor turned on. It
is straightforward to implement other policies. For example, one
could turn these features on only after encountering the ﬁrst fail-
ure, then turn them back off again after ClearView ﬁnds a patch
that eliminates the failure or when the community goes for a cer-
tain period of time without observing a failure.
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ager next generates candidate repair patches for all of the correlated
invariants, speciﬁcally by generating and compiling a snippet of
C code that implements the invariant check and enforcement (see
Section 2.5). It then uses the Determina infrastructure to apply and
remove the patches to or from running or newly launched instances
of the application as appropriate to implement the ClearView re-
pair evaluation algorithm (see Section 2.6). Ideally, this repair al-
gorithm eventually ﬁnds a successful patch which is applied across
the entire community (including instances of the application which
have never encountered the failure).
Multiple Concurrent Failures: It is possible for the community
to encounter different failures at the same time (the Red Team exer-
cise explored such a scenario). Because all ClearView patches are
applied in response to a speciﬁc failure (as identiﬁed by the failure
location) and all ClearView communications identify the failure ul-
timately responsible for the communication, ClearView is able to
successfully manage the community as it responds to the events
generated in response to multiple different concurrent failures.
4. Red Team Exercise
As part of DARPA’s Application Communities program (www.
darpa.mil/IPTO/programs/ac/ac.asp), DARPA hired Sparta,
Inc.(www.sparta.com)toperformanindependent, adversarialRed
Team evaluation of ClearView. The Red Team consisted of eleven
Sparta engineers. The goal of the Red Team was to discover and
exploit ﬂaws in our approach and in the ClearView implementa-
tion. The other Red Team exercise participants consisted of the
Blue Team (the authors of this paper) and the White Team (a group
of engineers from Mitre, Inc. led by Chris Doh of Mitre). The
White Team determined the rules of engagement and refereed the
exercise. The exercise was held at MIT on February 25 - 28, 2008.
During this exercise the Red Team used ten distinct exploits
to attack the application protected by ClearView (Firefox 1.0.0).
All of these exploits were veriﬁed to successfully exploit a se-
curity vulnerability in the unprotected version of Firefox. Clear-
View detected and blocked all attacks, terminating Firefox before
the attacks took effect. Moreover, ClearView generated successful
patches for seven of the ten attacks. All patches that ClearView’s
evaluation mechanism determined to be effective were, in fact, suc-
cessful: they enabled the application to survive the attack and con-
tinue to execute successfully after the attack.
4.1 Evaluation Goals
The primary purpose of the Red Team exercise was to evaluate
the effectiveness of the ClearView technology in protecting against
binary code injection attacks, i.e., attacks that attempt to subvert
the control ﬂow of the application, typically by causing the appli-
cation to jump to downloaded code, but more generally by causing
the application to take any unauthorized control ﬂow transfer. This
particular class of attacks was chosen because they are common in
practice and can have particularly serious consequences if success-
ful. The Red Team evaluation had several speciﬁc goals:
• Surviving Attacks: Determine if ClearView can respond to
attacks by ﬁnding patches that enable the application to sur-
vive the attack and continue to execute successfully.
• Repair Evaluation: Determine if ClearView can generate
a patch that impairs the application in some way, either by
causing it to behave incorrectly on legitimate inputs or by
creating a new exploitable error.
• False Positives: Determine if legitimate inputs can trigger
the ClearView patch generation mechanism.
• Infrastructure Attacks: Determine if attackers can subvert
the ClearView patch generation and distribution mechanism
to send out malicious patches. This paper omits the detailed
resultsofthisqualitativeevaluation, butinsummarythestan-
dard security measures already in place in the Determina
commercial product (encryption, authentication, etc.) were
judged to provide an acceptable level of protection against
this class of attacks.
4.2 Rules of Engagement
The rules of engagement determined the scope of the Red Team
exercise — what kinds of Red Team attacks were in bounds, how
to judge if an attack succeeded or failed, the access that the Red
Team was given to Blue Team information, etc. Together, the Red,
Blue, and White Teams agreed on an application (the unmodiﬁed,
stripped x86 binary of Firefox 1.0.0) for the Blue Team to protect.
With this application, the attack vector was web pages — the Red
Team launched all attacks by navigating Firefox to one or more at-
tack HTML, XUL, or GIF ﬁles. Firefox 1.0.0 has several properties
that made it appropriate for this exercise:
• Mature Code Base: The Firefox code base was relatively
matureandtested, whichmadeitareasonableproxyforother
mature applications that ClearView is designed to protect.
• Vulnerabilities: This version of Firefox contained enough
vulnerabilities to support a thorough evaluation without the
need for the Red Team to ﬁnd an infeasibly large number of
new vulnerabilities.
• Source Code Availability: Source code was available for
this application. Although ClearView does not require (or
even use) any source information, the availability of source
code made it much easier to understand the behavior of the
application and interpret the phenomena observed during the
Red Team exercise.
• Automation: Firefox supported the automated loading of
web pages, which facilitated automated learning and testing
both in preparation for and during the Red Team exercise.
• High Availability Requirements: In the future, much of the
Internet content that users will need or want to access may
contain exploits (see Section 6.2). Terminating Firefox when
it encounters an attack (or ﬁltering out content with exploits)
may therefore substantially impair its utility.
Given the envisioned scope of the Red Team exercise and the avail-
able resources, it was not feasible to add more applications to the
Red Team exercise.
4.2.1 Attack Scope
The Red Team attacks fall into three categories: control ﬂow at-
tacks, inducedautoimmuneattacks, andfalsepositiveattacks. Con-
trol ﬂow attacks attempt to subvert the ﬂow of control within the
application. Such an attack was judged to succeed if it prevented
the application from continuing to successfully process additional
inputs, either by successfully redirecting the ﬂow of control to ma-
licious code or by causing the application to crash.
A false positive attack succeeds when it causes ClearView to ap-
ply a patch in response to loading a legitimate web page.
Induced autoimmune attacks attempt to turn the ClearView patch
mechanism against the application. Such an attack succeeds if it
ClearView’s patch affects the behavior of the application on legit-
imate inputs (as opposed to attack inputs). An autoimmune attack
was judged to succeed if the patched version of Firefox, when made
to navigate to a sequence of legitimate web pages, did not behave
the same as the unpatched version (bit-identical displays, same user
functionality).
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free rein in generating attacks. Known attacks, variants on known
attacks, completely new attacks, and attacks that involved different
web pages loaded in sequence were all within scope. There were
no restrictions whatsoever placed on the information that the Red
Team was allowed to use when generating attacks.
4.2.2 Red Team Exercise Preparation
Prior to the Red Team exercise, the Blue Team generated an in-
variant database by running Firefox on a collection of twelve web
pages that exercise functionality related to known Firefox vulnera-
bilities. Learning was conﬁned to selected regions of the applica-
tion related to these vulnerabilities. The web pages and invariant
database were both made available to the Red Team before the Red
Team exercise.
Several months before the Red Team exercise, the Blue Team
provided the Red Team with all of the Blue Team’s source code,
tests, and documentation, including design documents, presenta-
tions to sponsors, and the Blue Team’s own analyses of weaknesses
inClearView. DuringtheperiodoftimeleadinguptotheRedTeam
exercise, the Blue Team periodically provided the Red Team with
source code, test, and documentation updates. At the time of the
Red Team exercise, the Red Team had complete access to all of the
source code, tests, and documentation for the running Blue Team
system.
Prior to the Red Team exercise, the Red Team selected 57 eval-
uation web pages. These legitimate web pages exercise a range of
Firefox functionality and were used during the Red Team exercise
for repair evaluation (speciﬁcally, to determine if the patched ver-
sion of Firefox displayed the evaluation pages correctly) and false
positive evaluation (speciﬁcally, to determine if any of the evalua-
tion pages triggered the ClearView patch generation mechanism).
The Blue Team was not provided with these web pages prior to the
Red Team exercise.
For the Red Team exercise, the Blue Team provisioned a small
community of machines with Firefox deployed on all machines.
TheBlueTeam conﬁguredClearViewwithMemory Firewall, Heap
Guard, and the Shadow Stack enabled from the start on all Firefox
executions.2 The Red Team attacked this community during the
Red Team exercise.
4.3 Attack Evaluation
The ﬁrst phase of the Red Team exercise evaluated ClearView’s
ability to protect Firefox against Red Team attacks. The Red Team
selected ten defects in Firefox, then created one or more exploits
for each defect. The targeted defects cause exploitable errors such
as unchecked JavaScript types, out of bounds array accesses, heap
and stack buffer overﬂows, and JavaScript garbage collection prob-
lems. All of the exploits were veriﬁed to work — they successfully
exploited a vulnerability in Firefox. The Red Team used the ex-
ploits to perform the following attacks.
4.3.1 Single Variant Attacks
For each defect, the Red Team chose an exploit, then repeatedly
presented the exploit to an instance of Firefox running in the com-
munity. The Red Team presented each attack only after ClearView
had performed all actions taken in response to the previous attack.
For all ten exploits, ClearView monitors detected and blocked the
2With one exception. Speciﬁcally, the presence of Heap Guard
disabled the exploit for the defect with Bugzilla number 296134.
To enable the meaningful inclusion of this exploit in the Red Team
exercise, the Blue Team turned off Heap Guard when the Red Team
deployed this exploit.
Bugzilla Number Presentations Error Type
269095 6 Memory Management
*285595 4 Heap Buffer Overﬂow
290162 4 Unchecked JavaScript Type
295854 5 Unchecked JavaScript Type
296134 4 Stack Overﬂow
311710 12 Out of Bounds Array Access
312278 4 Memory Management
320182 6 Memory Management
*325403 4 Heap Buffer Overﬂow
Table 1: Number of times each exploit was presented before
ClearView created and applied a patch that protected against
the exploit. A * identiﬁes the two exploits for which ClearView
did not successfully generate a patch during the Red Team ex-
ercise, but did successfully generate a patch in subsequent ex-
periments after reconﬁguration.
corresponding attacks. For seven of the exploits, ClearView gen-
erated patches that enabled Firefox to continue to execute through
the attacks to correctly display the subsequently loaded evaluation
pages. TheRedTeamobservednodifferences betweenthepatched
and unpatched versions of Firefox. Subsequent investigation af-
ter the Red Team exercise (see Section 4.3.2) indicated that small
conﬁguration changes enabled ClearView to successfully generate
patches for two of the remaining three exploits.
Table 1 presents the number of exploit presentations required for
ClearView to ﬁnd and apply the patch that enabled Firefox to exe-
cutesuccessfullythroughtheattack. Ingeneral, theminimumnum-
ber of exploit presentations is four. The ﬁrst presentation makes
ClearView aware of the exploit; ClearView responds by comput-
ing a set of candidate correlated invariants and applying patches
that check candidate invariants (see Sections 2.4.1 and 2.4.2). Dur-
ing the next two presentations ClearView records invariant satis-
faction and violation information to compute the set of correlated
invariants (see Section 2.4.3). After these presentations ClearView
removes the invariant checking patches and generates and applies
patchesthatenforcecorrelatedinvariants(seeSections2.5and2.6).
If the ﬁrst invariant enforcement patch is successful, ClearView has
corrected the error in four presentations.
As Table 1 indicates, the ﬁrst invariant enforcement patch suc-
cessfullycorrectedtheerrorsfromexploits290162, 296134, 312278,
285595, and 325403. For exploit 295854 the ﬁrst patch did not cor-
rect the error, but the second patch did. For exploits 269095 and
320182 the third patch was the ﬁrst successful patch.
Exploit 311710 is an outlier in that it involves three separate de-
fects, eachofwhichisexploitedbythesameattack. ClearViewcor-
rects the error from the ﬁrst defect after four presentations, at which
point the attack exploits the second defect. It takes ClearView an-
other four presentations to correct the error from this second defect,
at which point the attack exploits the third defect. It takes Clear-
View another four presentations to correct the error from this ﬁnal
defect, for a total of twelve presentations to obtain a set of patches
that enables Firefox to successfully survive the attack.
Stack Overﬂow: Exploit 296134 causes Firefox to erroneously
compute a negative value for the length of a string. This nega-
tive length is then passed to memcpy, which treats it as a very large
unsigned integer. The resulting copy writes downloaded data over
exception handlers on the stack. When the copy proceeds past the
end of the stack, the invoked overwritten exception handler exe-
cutes downloaded code.
During learning ClearView learned a lower-bound invariant that
requires the computed string length to be at least one. ClearView
generated a patch that enforced this invariant by setting the length
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and enabled Firefox to survive the attack.
Unchecked JavaScript Type Exploits: Both exploits 290162 and
295854 download JavaScript code that creates an object, then ﬁlls
the object with malicious code and data. A JavaScript system rou-
tine fails to check the type of the object and (eventually via a se-
quence of operations) invokes downloaded code via a C++ virtual
function call on the corrupted object.
During learning ClearView learned a one-of invariant at the vir-
tual function call site for both errors. These invariants state that
the call site may invoke only one of the functions invoked at that
site during learning. The ﬁrst patch that ClearView applied dur-
ing repair evaluation enforced the invariant by invoking a speciﬁc
previously invoked function instead of jumping to malicious code.
This patch successfully corrected the error from exploit 290162,
but failed to correct the error from exploit 295854. ClearView’s
second applied patch, which enforced the invariant by skipping the
call, successfully corrected the error from exploit 295854.
Memory Management Exploits: Exploit 312278 enables down-
loaded JavaScript code to obtain a pointer to an object that is erro-
neously garbage collected, then reallocated to hold a native Firefox
C++ object. The downloaded JavaScript code then overwrites the
C++ object’s virtual function table pointer with a pointer to mem-
ory containing pointers to malicious downloaded code. During
learning ClearView learned a one-of invariant at the virtual func-
tion call site that invokes the malicious code. This invariant states
that the call site may invoke only one of the functions invoked at
thatsiteduringlearning. TheﬁrstpatchthatClearViewapplieddur-
ing repair evaluation successfully corrected the error by invoking a
speciﬁc previously invoked function.
Exploits269095and320182involvememorythatisnotreinitial-
ized after it is reallocated. Under certain circumstances it is possi-
ble to manipulate Firefox into treating this uninitialized memory as
a C++ object, then invoking a virtual function call on this unini-
tialized object. Downloaded JavaScript code can exploit this error
to ﬁll the memory with appropriately formatted malicious code and
pointers before it is reallocated. In this case the virtual function call
invokes the malicious code. During learning ClearView learned a
one-of invariant at the virtual function call site that invokes the ma-
licious code. One of the patches that ClearView applied during
repair evaluation enforced the invariant by returning from the func-
tion that contains the call site before the call site is invoked. This
patch enabled Firefox to survive the attack.
Before trying this patch, ClearView tried patches that invoke one
of the previously observed functions and a patch that skips the call
but executes the remaining part of the function following the call.
Neither of these patches enabled Firefox to survive the attack.
Out of Bounds Array Access Exploits: Exploit 311710 causes
Firefox to compute a negative array index, then use the index to
attempt to retrieve a C++ object from the array. Downloaded Java-
Scriptcodepreviouslycausedtheretrievedmemorytocontainpoint-
ers to downloaded code. When Firefox performs a virtual function
call on the retrieved object, it invokes the downloaded code.
During learning ClearView learned a lower-bound invariant that
requires the array index to be non-negative. During repair evalua-
tion ClearView applied a patch that enforces this invariant by set-
ting the array index to zero. This patch caused Firefox to retrieve
a valid C++ object, the resulting virtual function call invoked valid
code, and Firefox survived the attack.
The same defect that caused this error was present in three simi-
larprocedures(apparentlycreatedviacopyandpaste)thatexecuted
during the attack. A similar patch corrected all of the errors from
these defects.
4.3.2 Remaining Exploits
DuringtheRedTeamexercise, ClearViewdidnotgenerateasuc-
cessful patch for three of the Red Team’s exploits. Exploit 285595
targets code for an unused Netscape GIF extension. Because this
code does not check the sign of a value extracted from the GIF ﬁle,
it is vulnerable to a remotely exploitable heap overﬂow attack. Dur-
ing the Red Team exercise, ClearView’s correlated invariant identi-
ﬁcation component was conﬁgured to consider invariants from only
the lowest procedure on the stack with invariants. The relevant in-
variant appeared one procedure above this procedure. ClearView
therefore did not produce a patch that corrected the error. We sub-
sequently veriﬁed that changing the conﬁguration to include ad-
ditional procedures on the stack enabled ClearView to generate a
successful patch that corrects this error. The relevant invariant is a
lower-bound invariant involving a buffer index. The repair changes
the index from a negative value to zero, thereby bringing out of
bounds writes back into the buffer. The exploit itself is embedded
within an image ﬁle. The repair neutralizes the attack and enables
Firefox to display the image correctly.
Exploit 325403 involves a downloaded HTML ﬁle that can spec-
ify a buffer growth size for data that does not ﬁt in an allocated
buffer that holds two-byte Unicode characters. By specifying a
buffer growth size very close to the largest number that ﬁts in an
integer, an attacker can cause the calculation of the new buffer size
to overﬂow, causing Firefox to allocate a buffer that is too small.
An ensuing memcpy then writes beyond the end of the allocated
buffer. The Blue Team’s learning suite for the Red Team exercise
did not provide sufﬁcient coverage for Daikon to learn the relevant
invariant. We subsequently veriﬁed that, using an expanded learn-
ing suite, Daikon would have learned an invariant that would have
enabled ClearView to generate a successful patch. The relevant in-
variant is a less-than invariant relating the buffer size to the size of
the memory to copy into the buffer. The repair sets the copy size to
the buffer size, eliminating the out of bounds writes.
Exploit 307259 causes Firefox to compute an incorrect size for a
buffer holding a hostname that contains soft hyphens. When Fire-
fox attempts to copy a number of items into this buffer, the copies
write beyond the end of the buffer. ClearView did not generate a
successful patch because Daikon’s invariants are not rich enough
to capture the error. The appropriate invariant would generalize
Daikon’s less-than invariant (which relates two quantities) to relate
a sum of buffer lengths to another buffer length. Learning richer
invariants would be possible, but would increase the cost of the
learning component.
4.3.3 Comparison With Manual Fixes
Manual ﬁxes are available for the defects that the exploits in the
Red Team exercise exploited. For exploit 269095, the manual ﬁx
tags deallocated objects as invalid. Subsequent object uses check
this tag. If the tag is invalid, the use returns an error. The ﬁx also
iterates over invalid objects to reinitialize relevant data. For exploit
285595, the manual ﬁx removes the code containing the defect.
This code implemented a Netscape GIF extension; the ﬁx removes
support for this extension from Firefox. For exploits 290162 and
295854, the manual ﬁx checks the type of the JavaScript object.
If the check fails, the enclosing method (which otherwise invokes
a method on the object) simply returns null. For exploit 296134,
the manual ﬁx adds a check for negative string length. If the check
fails, the enclosing method logs an error, returns, and does not per-
form the copy. The ﬁx also includes a check in the calling method
that truncates the string length to the allocated buffer size. The
manual ﬁx for 311710 corrects a conditional that caused the appli-
cation to compute the negative array index.
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that it holds a reference to the relevant object. Once the garbage
collector is aware of this reference, it does not collect the object
and the memory holding the object is unavailable to the JavaScript
code in the exploit. For exploit 320182, the manual ﬁx sets a ﬂag
that identiﬁes reallocated objects. Subsequent code checks the ﬂag
to identify and properly initialize any such reallocated objects. For
exploit 325403, the manual ﬁx checks that the target array is large
enough to hold the data in the source array. If the check fails, the
ﬁx allocates a larger target array and retries the copy.
Some of these manual ﬁxes perform a consistency check close
to the error, then skip the remaining part of the operation if the
check fails. All ClearView patches similarly perform a consistency
check (the invariant satisfaction check) close to the error. Two of
the ClearView repairs (skip call and return from enclosing proce-
dure) have a similar effect of explicitly skipping part or all of the
remaining part of the operation. Other repairs (adjusting values to
enforce lower-bound and less-than relationships) often have the ef-
fect of enabling the application to execute the remaining part of the
operation safely with the effect of any remaining errors localized
to that operation. In general, the ClearView repairs tend to execute
more of the normal-case code following the error, while the manual
ﬁxes tend to simply abort the current operation. We attribute this
more drastic approach to the maintainer attempting to simplify the
reasoning required to conﬁrm that the ﬁx has eliminated the error.
It would be possible to enhance ClearView to produce checks
and repairs that more closely correspond to these manual ﬁxes. For
example, it would be possible to enhance ClearView to automat-
ically infer object types at dynamically dispatched method invo-
cations and to return error codes from enclosing procedures when
invariant checks fail. It would also be possible to develop repairs
that skip larger parts of the subsequent computation.
Some of the manual ﬁxes inform the garbage collector of exist-
ing references and reinitialize recycled memory. These ﬁxes af-
fect code far from the failure location. ClearView would therefore
need to apply a more sophisticated correlated invariant identiﬁca-
tion strategy (and potentially more sophisticated invariants as well)
to produce repairs with similar effects.
4.3.4 Multiple Variant Attacks
For three defects, the Red Team generated multiple variants of
the exploit that targeted the defect. For each defect the Red Team
interleaved different variants during the attack. ClearView gener-
ated the same patch after the same number of attacks as for the cor-
responding single variant attack. This patch successfully protected
Firefox against all variants of the attack.
4.3.5 Simultaneous Multiple Exploit Attacks
The Red Team launched several attacks that interleaved exploits
that targeted different defects. The goal was to determine if tar-
geting different defects with different exploits would impair Clear-
View’s ability to generate successful patches. In each case Clear-
View was able to determine the targeted error for each attack, keep
the learning data separate for the different errors, and generate a set
of patches that together successfully protected Firefox against all
of the exploits in the attack. And ClearView was able to generate
these patches after the same cumulative number of attacks as for
the corresponding sequence of single variant attacks.
4.3.6 Repair Evaluation
For all of the previous attack scenarios the Red Team evaluated
thequalityoftherepairbydeterminingwhetherthepatchedversion
of Firefox displayed the evaluation web pages correctly (which it
always did).
The ﬁnal repair evaluation started with applying all of the suc-
cessful patches generated during the previous attacks to Firefox.
The Red Team then used this patched version of Firefox to display
all of the evaluation pages. In each case the displays were identical
to the displays produced by the unpatched version, with no other
behavioral change that the Red Team could detect. This result indi-
cates that the Red Team was unable to launch a successful induced
autoimmune attack.
In general, the ClearView repair evaluation mechanism is de-
signed to ﬁnd and discard patches that have a negative effect on the
application. And in fact, ClearView did generate patches with neg-
ative effects (such as causing the application to crash) during the
Red Team exercise. But the repair evaluation mechanism detected
and discarded these patches, mitigating the effect on the application
and paving the way for the application of successful patches.
4.3.7 False Positive Evaluation
The Red Team’s false positive evaluation used ClearView to dis-
play the evaluation web pages. The goal was to make ClearView
generate an unnecessary patch. During this evaluation ClearView
generated no patches at all, indicating that the Red Team was un-
able to cause ClearView to produce a false positive.
4.4 Performance
The Red Team exercise used a Dell 2950 rack-mount machine
with 16 GB of RAM and two 2.3 GHz Intel Xeon processors, each
with four processor cores. We ran Firefox inside VMware virtual
machines under ESX servers. The operating system was Windows
XP Service Pack 2. Because the Red Team’s exploit 296134 has no
effect in this environment, we ran this exploit on a 1.8 GHz AMD
Opteron machine with four processor cores and 8 Gbytes of RAM
running Windows XP Service Pack 2. In this environment the ex-
ploit does trigger the error. Because the exploit is running on a
slower computing platform, the execution times for the various ac-
tivitiesare, ingeneral, proportionallylongerthanthecorresponding
times for other exploits.
4.4.1 Learning Overhead
The time required to load the twelve learning web pages without
learning enabled was 5.2 seconds. The time required to load these
same web pages with learning enabled was 1600 seconds (over a
factor of 300 slower). The Daikon x86 front end, which records
and dumps the values of accessed memory locations and registers,
is responsible for the vast majority of the overhead. As described in
Section 3.1, it is possible to distribute the learning in parallel across
the application community.
4.4.2 Baseline Overheads
Table 2 presents the times required for Firefox to load the 57
evaluation pages from a local disk with the network interface dis-
abled when running under various ClearView conﬁgurations. We
ran the experiments on an Intel Core 2 Duo E6700 (2.66 GHz, 4
MB L2 Cache, 3.25 GB RAM) running Windows XP Service Pack
3. The Determina Managed Program Execution Environment (with
Memory Firewall enabled) imposes a 47% overhead over running
Firefox as a standalone application. This overhead is somewhat
larger than typically observed [4]. We attribute this additional over-
head to Firefox’s use of object-oriented constructs such as dynamic
method dispatch. With standard hardware jump optimization tech-
niques, the underlying DynamoRIO code cache implementation of
the resulting indirect jump instructions is relatively less efﬁcient
than implementations of other instruction patterns [4].
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ClearView Conﬁguration Time (seconds) Ratio
Bare Firefox 7.5 1.0
Memory Firewall 11.04 1.47
Memory Firewall + Shadow Stack 14.90 1.97
Memory Firewall + Heap Guard 18.97 2.53
Memory Firewall + Heap Guard + 22.70 3.03
Shadow Stack
Table 2: Page load times and overheads for different ClearView
conﬁgurations running Firefox.
4.4.3 Patch Generation Time
On average ClearView took 4.9 minutes from the time of the ﬁrst
exposure to a new exploit to the time when it obtained a successful
patch for that exploit. This is not the time required to stop a propa-
gating attack — Memory Firewall terminates the application before
the attack can take effect, so there is no propagation. These times
instead reﬂect how long users must wait before they have a patched
version of the application that provides continuous, uninterrupted
service even while under attack.
The 4.9 minutes includes an average of 5.4 executions: to de-
tect the failure and select a set of candidate correlated invariants, to
collect invariant checking results to identify correlated invariants,
and to evaluate candidate repairs. These averages include one out-
lier, for which ClearView took 13 minutes to sequentially correct
three distinct errors in the application, all of which were exploited
by the same attack — after ClearView repaired one error, the same
exploit triggered an error from a different defect which ClearView
then detected and repaired, and so on.
4.4.4 Patch Creation Time Breakdowns
When considering how much time ClearView takes to create a
successful repair, one key comparison to keep in mind is the 28
days(onaverage)thatittakesfordeveloperstocreateanddistribute
a patch for a security exploit [41]. This section breaks down Clear-
View’s 4.9 minutes (on average) time to do the same.
Table 3 presents the different components of the time ClearView
requires to generate a successful repair. All times are in seconds.
With the exception of exploit 311710, there is one row for each
exploit. The ﬁrst column of each row presents the Bugzilla number
of the exploit. Exploit 311710 has three rows (labeled 311710a,
311710b, and 311710c). As described above, ClearView corrected
three distinct errors before enabling Firefox to ﬁnally survive the
attack. We place each error in a separate row.
Shadow Stack, Heap Guard Runs: The second column of each
row (Shadow Stack, Heap Guard Runs) in Table 3 presents the time
required to replay the exploit to detection with the Shadow Stack
and Heap Guard turned on. The vast majority of this time (20–
30 seconds) is spent warming up the Determina Managed Program
Execution Environment code cache when we restart Firefox to pro-
cess the exploit. For all exploits except 311710, this time is roughly
20 to 30 seconds. Because exploit 311710 exercises more Firefox
functionality than the other exploits, the times are higher for this
exploit. Our presentation of the numbers in this column makes
it possible to compute successful patch generation times for a de-
ployment environment in which only Memory Firewall is enabled
during production use, with Heap Guard and the Shadow Stack en-
abled only after the detection of the ﬁrst attack.
We note that it is possible for ClearView to successfully correct
errors with only Memory Firewall enabled. And in fact, the use of
Heap Guard did not improve ClearView’s performance in the Red
Team exercise — Memory Firewall and Shadow Stack are all that is
required for ClearView to generate successful patches for the seven
exploits that it successfully patched during the Red Team exercise.
Heap Guard is required for the remaining two exploits for which
ClearView was able to subsequently generate successful patches
after conﬁguration changes.
Building and Installing Invariant Checks: The Building Invari-
ant Checks column presents the time required to build all of the
invariant check patches. This time includes compiling the auto-
matically generated C source code for the patches and loading the
patches into a DLL for presentation to the Determina patch man-
agement system. Each entry has the form t[x,y,z], where t is the
time required to build the invariant checks, x is the number of
checked one-of invariants, y is the number of checked lower-bound
invariants, and z is the number of checked less-than invariants. Ex-
ploit 296134 is an outlier, in part because ClearView compiled
many more invariant check patches than for the other exploits and
in part because the compiles took place on a slower computing plat-
form. The Installing Invariant Checks column presents the time re-
quired for the Determina patch management system to transmit and
apply the patches to the application running on the client machine.
InvariantCheckRuns: TheInvariantCheckRunscolumnpresents
the time required to replay the exploit to detection twice with the
invariant check patches in place. Each entry has the form t(x/y),
where t is the time required to replay the exploit to detection twice,
x is the number of times a checked invariant was violated during
these runs, and y is the total number of invariant checks executed
during these runs. The time t includes the time required to com-
municate the necessary invariant check, shadow stack, and attack
location information to the ClearView Manager. As before, much
of the time was spent warming up the Determina Managed Program
Execution Environment code cache. For exploit 296134 ClearView
also spent a substantial amount of time communicating invariant
check results to the ClearView Manager using the Windows event
queue mechanism.3
Building and Installing Repair Patches: The Building Repair
Patches column presents the time required to build all of the re-
pair patches for the correlated invariants to evaluate. Each entry
has the form t[x,y,z], where t is the time required to build the re-
pair patches, x is the number of correlated one-of invariants, y is
the number of correlated lower-bound invariants, and z is the num-
ber of correlated less-than invariants.4 All of the correlated one-of
invariants involve function pointers. As described above in Sec-
tion 2.5.1, such invariants have three potential repairs. ClearView
compiles a patch for each such repair. The other kinds of invariants
each have a single repair with a single repair patch. The Installing
Repair Patches column presents the time required to communicate
these patches to the client machine. The client machine applied
speciﬁc repair patches one at a time in response to directives from
the central ClearView Manager.
Unsuccessful Repair Runs: The Unsuccessful Repair Runs col-
umn presents the time (if any) required to execute Firefox to com-
pletionforanyunsuccessfulrepairpatches. Eachentryhastheform
t(x), where t is the time required to execute Firefox to completion
and x is the number of unsuccessful runs (if any). We attribute the
small number of unsuccessful runs to the effectiveness of the corre-
lated invariant selection policy in targeting invariants whose repairs
are likely to correct the error and to the effectiveness of the candi-
date repair ordering rule in selecting an effective repair to evaluate
ﬁrst.
3For exploit 296134 we are missing the number of times that the
invariant checks were executed and the number of times that the
corresponding invariants were violated.
4For exploit 296134 we are missing the number of correlated
lower-bound and less-than invariants.
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Bugzilla Heap Guard Building Invariant Invariant Repair Repair Unsuccessful Successful
Number Runs Invariant Checks Checks Check Runs Patches Patches Repair Runs Repair Run Total
269095 25.31 12.67 [1,0,1] 8.71 51.95 (4/28) 10.95 [1,0,0] 7.28 51.40(2) 34.50 202.77
*285595 25.38 12.18 [0,5,0] 8.47 74.26 (6/2216) 11.48 [0,3,0] 8.79 - 31.84 172.40
290162 27.14 9.76 [2,0,0] 7.79 47.68 (2/2) 10.92 [1,0,0] 8.40 - 32.64 144.33
295854 32.81 8.82 [1,0,0] 9.20 66.29 (2/0) 10.34 [1,0,0] 8.10 31.11(1) 39.82 206.49
296134 39.31 63.83 [0,42,10] 5.89 279.05 (?/?) 30.27 [0,?,?] 6.23 - 50.22 474.80
!307259 26.14 49.39 [0,4,26] 4.45 1235.53 (7444/29428) 39.66 [0,1,6] 6.28 347.69(7) - 1709.11
311710a 52.00 14.22 [0,1,2] 9.19 151.29 (60/1460) 11.34 [0,1,0] 6.83 - 69.05 313.92
311710b 60.48 13.50 [0,1,2] 8.27 152.30 (60/1460) 13.38 [0,1,0] 5.48 - 57.60 311.01
311710c 51.56 17.56 [0,1,2] 8.38 161.44 (60/1460) 16.17 [0,1,0] 8.16 - 64.02 327.29
312278 24.30 8.56 [1,0,0] 7.22 48.49 (2/0) 11.65 [1,0,0] 8.00 - 33.29 141.51
320182 25.31 12.67 [1,0,1] 8.71 51.95 (4/28) 10.95 [1,0,0] 7.28 51.40(2) 34.50 202.77
*325403 24.21 16.93 [0,0,2] 5.90 46.81 (4/0) 10.57 [0,0,2] 6.01 - 33.48 143.91
Table 3: ClearView attack processing times, in seconds. Because all timing events were measured on the central ClearView Manager,
the times include communication times between the protected client and the manager. Attacks for exploit 296134 were run on a
slower computer (see Section 4.4.4). A * identiﬁes the two exploits for which ClearView did not successfully generate a patch during
the Red Team exercise, but did successfully generate a patch in subsequent experiments after reconﬁguration. A ! identiﬁes the
exploit for which ClearView did not successfully generate a patch in either the Red Team exercise or in subsequent experiments.
SuccessfulRepairRun: TheSuccessfulRepairRuncolumnshows
thetimerequiredtoexecuteFirefoxwiththesuccessfulrepairpatch
applied. Because this patch corrects the error and eliminates the at-
tack detection, the patch was judged to succeed ten seconds after it
executed with no subsequent attack detection. The presented time
includes this ten seconds. At this point ClearView generated and
identiﬁed a patch that corrected the error and enabled continued
successful execution. The ﬁnal column is the sum of the times in
the other columns. It presents the total time required to automati-
cally obtain a successful patch for the corresponding attack.
4.4.5 Overhead Reduction Techniques
There are three primary sources of inefﬁciency in the current
ClearViewattackresponsesystem: warminguptheDeterminaMan-
aged Program Execution Environment code cache, using Windows
event queues as the communication mechanism between commu-
nity members and the centralized server, and compiling the invari-
ant check and repair patches. It is possible to eliminate the cache
warm up time by saving the cache state from a previous run, then
restoring this state upon startup. It is possible to dramatically re-
duce the communication time by using a more efﬁcient commu-
nication mechanism. It is possible to eliminate the compilation
time by generating binary code directly instead of generating, then
compiling C code. Together, we estimate that these optimizations
would enable ClearView to produce successful patches in tens of
seconds rather than minutes.
4.5 Other Applications
In general, we believe the Firefox results to be broadly repre-
sentative of the results ClearView would deliver for other server
applications. Many of the ClearView patches have a similar ef-
fect as other techniques such as failure-oblivious computing [29,
27, 30] and transactional function termination [36, 35]. Speciﬁ-
cally, enforcing lower-bound and less-than invariants may coerce
otherwise out of bounds references back within the bounds of the
accessed block of memory. Like failure-oblivious computing, this
coercion localizes the effects of out of bounds write errors and pre-
ventsotherwisefatalglobalcorruptionoftheapplicationstate. Like
transactional function termination, enforcing one-of invariants in-
volving function pointers by skipping calls or returning from the
calling procedure can eliminate the execution of the code that con-
tains an otherwise exploitable defect. Both failure-oblivious com-
puting and transactional function termination have been shown to
be effective in enabling a range of servers to successfully survive a
range of errors and attacks.
We note that because ClearView is based on inferred invariants
(which may capture aspects of the application’s semantics) it may,
in principle, be able to generate more targeted and therefore more
effective repairs. ClearView also incorporates a broader range of
repair strategies and evaluates the resulting multiple candidate re-
pairs to discard ineffective or damaging repairs, which may en-
hance its ability to ﬁnd successful patches.
We have less experience applying survival techniques to appli-
cations other than servers. In general, we anticipate that survival
strategies will be more effective for the broad range of applica-
tions (such as applications that process sensory data and informa-
tion retrieval applications) that can tolerate some variation in the
result that the computation produces. We anticipate that survival
techniques may be less appropriate for applications (such as com-
piler transformations) with precise, logically deﬁned correctness
requirements, long dependence chains that run through the entire
computation, and less demanding availability requirements.
5. Limitations
The goal of ClearView is not to correct every conceivable error.
The goal is instead to correct a realistic class of errors to enable ap-
plications with high availability requirements to successfully pro-
vide service in spite of these errors.
Of course, there are errors that are completely outside the scope
of ClearView, i.e., errors for which there is no plausible learned in-
variant whose enforcement would enable the application to survive.
But even if the error is within the scope of the overall ClearView
approach, ClearView may be unable to ﬁnd a repair that enables the
application to survive the error:
• Learning: Daikon comes preconﬁgured to learn a speciﬁc
set of invariants. This set may not include an invariant that
enables ClearView to generate a patch for a given error. And
even if the set does include such an invariant, the learning
phase may not provide enough coverage of the application to
enable Daikon to learn this invariant.
• Monitoring: ClearView currently uses Memory Firewall to
detect control ﬂow transfer errors and Heap Guard to detect
out of bounds write errors. Additional detectors would be
required to detect other kinds of errors.
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invariant that ClearView selected as a candidate correlated
invariant. Even if ClearView inferred an invariant with a re-
pair that would correct the error, the failure may occur suf-
ﬁciently far from the error for ClearView to not include the
invariant in the set of candidate correlated invariants.
• Repair: The repair mechanism comes with a speciﬁc set
of invariant enforcement mechanisms; each such mechanism
corresponds to a speciﬁc repair strategy. It is possible for
none of these repair strategies to produce a successful repair.
It is also possible for ClearView to impair the functionality of the
application or even to create new vulnerabilities:
• Functionality Impairment: It is possible for a ClearView
repair patch to impair the functionality of the application. If
the patch is applied in response to a legitimate attack, the
functionality impairment may be a reasonable price to pay
for eliminating the vulnerability. The fact that ClearView
applies patches only in response to a detected failure (in our
current implementation, an illegal control ﬂow transfer or out
of bounds write) and the fact that ClearView enforces the in-
variant only if it is correlated with the failure minimize the
likelihood that ClearView will apply a patch in the absence
of an error or attack. These facts also minimize the likeli-
hood that an applied ClearView patch will interfere with the
processing of a legitimate input. And the ClearView patch
evaluation mechanism enables ClearView to recognize and
discard patches that do not eliminate the failure or cause the
application to crash.
Note that ClearView did, in fact, generate several patches
with negative effects during the Red Team exercise. The
ClearView patch evaluation mechanism detected these nega-
tive effects and discarded the patches.
• Patch Subversion: It is theoretically possible for an adver-
sary to subvert the ClearView patch mechanism to install
its own malicious patches. We note that ClearView builds
on the commercially deployed Determina patch distribution
mechanism, which uses standard authentication and encryp-
tion mechanisms to ensure patch integrity.
• Malicious Nodes: It is theoretically possible for a malicious
node or nodes to provide ClearView with erroneous informa-
tion that may cause it to generate an inappropriate patch. It is
possible to mitigate this possibility by reproducing the error
and evaluating the generated patches on trusted nodes before
distributing the patches throughout the community.
6. Related Work
We discuss additional related work in attack detection mech-
anisms, automatic ﬁlter generation, checkpoint and replay tech-
niques, and error tolerance and correction.
6.1 Attack Detection Mechanisms
ClearView uses two attack detection techniques: program shep-
herding to detect and block malicious control ﬂow transfers, and
heap overﬂow checks to detect and block out of bounds writes to
the heap. In general, however, ClearView can work with any at-
tack detection technique that provides an attack location. Stack-
Guard [9] and StackShield [39], for example, use a modiﬁed com-
piler to generate code to detect attacks that overwrite the return
address on the stack. StackShield also performs range checks to
detect overwritten function pointers. Researchers have also built
compilers that insert bounds checks to detect memory addressing
errors in C programs [2, 43, 6, 18, 31, 19, 20]. Drawbacks of these
techniques include the need to recompile the program, the over-
head of the dynamic bounds checks, and, in some cases, the need to
change the program itself [6, 20]. Dynamic taint analysis ﬁnds ap-
pearances of potentially malicious data in sensitive locations such
as function pointers or return addresses [40, 10, 24]. It would be
possible to make ClearView work with all of these detectors, al-
though the high overhead and potential need for recompilation or
even source code changes goes against ClearView’s philosophy of
operating on stripped Windows binaries and minimizing the over-
head during normal execution.
The large overhead of many proposed protection techniques has
inspired attempts to reduce the performance impact on applica-
tions in production use. One commonly proposed technique is to
run heavily instrumented versions of potentially vulnerable appli-
cations on honeypots [38, 33, 1], leaving the production versions
unprotected against new attacks. When the honeypot is attacked,
the instrumentation can detect the attack and develop a response
that protects the production versions of the application. This tech-
nique can be applied to virtually any attack detection and response
mechanism that is too expensive to deploy directly on applications
running in production. It may also be possible to deploy expen-
sive attack detection mechanisms in a piecemeal fashion across a
community of machines, with each application instrumenting only
a small portion of its execution [23].
In contrast to systems which apply their attack analyses across
broad ranges of the application, ClearView uses the attack location
to dramatically narrow down the region of the application that it
instruments during its attack analysis and response generation ac-
tivities. This makes it possible to deploy sophisticated but expen-
sive analyses within this focused region of the application while
still keeping the total overhead small. A potential drawback of this
focus is that ClearView may miss the invariant required to correct
the underlying error in the application logic.
6.2 Automatic Filter Generation
A standard way to protect applications against attacks is to de-
velop ﬁlters that detect and discard exploits before they reach a
vulnerable application. Vigilante uses honeypots to detect attacks
and dynamically generate ﬁlters that check for exploits that fol-
low the same control-ﬂow path as the attack to exploit the same
vulnerability [8]. Bouncer uses symbolic techniques to generalize
Vigilante’s approach to ﬁlter out more exploits [7]. ShieldGen uses
Vigilante’s attack detection techniques to obtain exploits [11]. It
generates variants of each exploit and tests the variants to see if
they also exercise the vulnerability. It then produces a general ﬁlter
that discards all such variants.
Sweeper uses address randomization for efﬁcient attack detec-
tion [42]. This technique is efﬁcient enough to be deployed on
production versions of applications, but provides only probabilis-
tic protection and therefore leaves applications still vulnerable to
exploitation [32]. Sweeper uses attack replay in combination with
more expensive attack analysis techniques such as memory access
checks, dynamic taint analysis, and dynamic backward slicing. It
uses the information to generate ﬁlters that discard exploits before
theyreachvulnerableapplications. Sweeperalsobuildsvulnerability-
speciﬁc execution ﬁlters, which instrument selected instructions in-
volved in the attack to detect the attack. The attack response is to
use rollback plus replay to recover from the attack.
Discarding inputs that may contain exploits can deny users ac-
cess to content that they need or want to access. It is entirely possi-
ble, for example, for useful information sources such as legitimate
web pages, images, or presentations to become surreptitiously in-
ﬁltrated with exploits. Attackers may also create attractive content
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able applications) otherwise desirable or useful content containing
exploits. Consider that much of the content currently available on
the Internet is created for the purpose of generating advertising rev-
enue. An alternate (and presumably illegal) business model would
simply substitute attacks for advertisements. In all of these cases
it is desirable for applications to process inputs containing exploits
without enabling the attacks to succeed.
By enabling applications to execute successfully through other-
wiseexploitableerrors, ClearViewcanenableuserstoaccessuseful
or desirable information even if the input containing the informa-
tion also contains an exploit. The ClearView repair for one of the
heap overﬂow errors in the Red Team exercise, for example, makes
it possible for users to view useful or attractive image ﬁles that also
contain exploits (or that contain innocent data that happens to exer-
cise the vulnerability).
6.3 Checkpoint and Replay
A traditional and widely used error recovery mechanism is to
reboot the system, with operations replayed as necessary to bring
the system back up to date [17]. It may also be worthwhile to re-
cursively restart larger and larger subsystems until the system suc-
cessfully recovers [5]. Checkpointing [22] can improve the perfor-
mance of the basic reboot process and help minimize the amount of
lost state in the absence of replay. Checkpointing also makes it pos-
sible to discard the effects of attacks and errors to restore the sys-
tem to a previously saved clean operational state. This approach,
in some cases combined with replay of previously processed re-
quests or operations that do not contain detected exploits, has been
proposed as an attack response mechanism [37, 26, 34, 35, 42].
In comparison with ClearView’s approach of continuing to exe-
cute through attacks, checkpoint plus replay has several drawbacks.
These include service interruptions as the system recovers from
an attack (these service interruptions can occur repeatedly unless
the system is otherwise protected against repeated attacks), the po-
tential for replay to fail because of problematic interactions with
external processes or machines that are outside the scope of the
checkpoint and replay mechanism, lost state if the system chooses
to forgo replay, and complications associated with applying check-
point and replay to multithreaded or multiprocess applications.
6.4 Error Tolerance and Correction
Transactional function termination [36, 33] (which restores the
stateatthetimeofthefunctioncall, thenreturnsfromfunctionsthat
perform out of bounds accesses), failure-oblivious computing [29]
(which discards out of bounds writes and manufactures values for
out of bounds reads), boundless memory blocks [28] (which store
out of bounds writes in a hash table for subsequent correspond-
ing reads to access), and DieHard [3] (which overprovisions the
heap so that out of bounds accesses are likely to fall into otherwise
unused memory) are all designed to allow applications to tolerate
errors such as out of bounds memory accesses. These techniques
require no learning phase and no repeated executions for correlated
invariant selection and evaluation. ClearView differs in applying
checks and repairs only to carefully targeted parts of the applica-
tion and only in response to attacks, and in performing an ongoing
evaluation of each applied repair. ClearView may also be able to
providemoreinformativeerrorreports, sinceit canidentifyspeciﬁc
invariants whose violation is correlated with errors.
In a previous project [12], we developed a system that automati-
cally inferred data structure consistency constraints and created re-
pairs [13] to enforce them. This system was also evaluated by a
(different) hostile Red Team. In contrast to ClearView, this pre-
vious system required source code, performed learning only once
without subsequent reﬁnements, applied only repairs that it stat-
ically veriﬁed to always terminate in a repaired state, and did not
observesubsequentexecutionstoevaluatethequalityoftherepairs.
ASSURE [35] generalizes transactional function termination to
enable the system to transactionally terminate any one of the func-
tions on the call stack at the time of the error (and not just the func-
tion containing the error). Attack replay on a triage machine en-
ables the system to evaluate which function to terminate to provide
the most successful recovery. The applied patch takes a checkpoint
at the start of the function. It responds to errors by restoring the
checkpoint, then returning an effective error code to terminate the
function and continue execution at the caller.
Exterminator [25] uses address space randomization to detect
out of bounds writes into the heap and accesses via dangling ref-
erences. It then corrects the errors by (as appropriate) increasing
the size of allocated memory blocks to accommodate the observed
out of bounds writes or delaying memory block deallocation until
the accesses via the corresponding dangling references have com-
pleted. Exterminator can combine patches from multiple users to
give members of a community of users immunity to out of bounds
write and dangling reference errors without prior exposure.
Researchers have used genetic programming techniques to gen-
erate and search a space of abstract syntax tree modiﬁcations with
the goal of automatically correcting an exercised defect in the un-
derlying program [16]. A test suite is used to evaluate the effective-
ness of each generated abstract syntax tree in preserving desirable
behavior and eliminating undesirable behavior.
All of these techniques can take the application outside of its
anticipated operating envelope. They therefore have the potential
to introduce new anomalies and errors. Of course, ClearView’s
patches also have the potential to negatively affect the application.
Because ClearView performs an ongoing evaluation of each de-
ployedpatch, itwillquicklydiscardpatchesthatenablenegativeef-
fects (such as crashes or attacks) in favor of more effective patches.
7. Conclusion
Errors in deployed software systems pose an important threat to
the integrity and utility of our computing infrastructure. Relying on
manual developer intervention to ﬁnd and eliminate errors can deny
service to application users or even leave the application open to
exploitation for long periods of time. ClearView’s automatic error
detection and correction techniques can provide, with no human
intervention whatsoever, the almost immediate correction of errors,
including errors that enable newly released security attacks. The
resultisanapplicationthatisimmunetotheattackandcancontinue
to provide uninterrupted service.
ClearView is targeted toward applications with high availabil-
ity requirements, for which a small chance of unexpected behavior
is preferable to the certainty of denial of service. The feasibility of
ourapproachhasbeenestablishedbyahostileRedTeamevaluation
in which ClearView automatically patched security vulnerabilities
without introducing new attack vectors that the Red Team could
exploit. We acknowledge that there are important reliability and
security problems that are outside the scope of ClearView. Nev-
ertheless, ClearView addresses an important and realistic problem,
and holds out the promise of substantially improving the integrity
and availability of our computing infrastructure.
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